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INTRODUCTION
The Middle East has long been a hot bed of conflict, as at least three main 
religions cite it as their birthplace.1 While the Christians were intimately involved in the 
conflicts during the Crusades, the Muslims and Jews have clashed most recently
regarding the former British Palestine.2
The hostilities have engendered a cycle of violence that has further devolved into 
disparate acts, which have resulted in crimes against humanity. These include: [1] 
Murder, [2] Torture, [3] Deportation, and [4] Persecution.3 These crimes were not simply 
single acts, but rather they are systematic and widespread attacks that attained a certain 
level of mens rea.4 In response, both the Palestinian authorities and citizens and what are 
now the Israeli government and its citizens have grown more intransigent in their beliefs
and more desperate in their responses. Peace negotiations have failed repeatedly in the 
midst of rising humanitarian costs.5
Further, a peace process that would help address the perpetration of crimes 
against humanity in Israel and the Occupied Territories has not been achieved due to a 
lack of commitment by the parties and the lack of a specific proposal that both sides can 
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2agree upon.  The commission of crimes against humanity has not slowed since the first 
Intifada.6 And, putting a stop to these crimes rests on the possibility of creating a lasting 
peace, a lasting peace, which may only be brought about with a holistic approach that 
addresses the peace process, security issues, and system-wide justice for crimes against 
humanity. The processes used in Northern Ireland can serve as a model in realizing peace
under these circumstances.
Northern Ireland has been involved in analogous conflicts for much of recent 
history. The Northern Irish Catholics have fought what they term as British and 
Protestant aggression and occupation, while the British and the Protestants have fought 
what they see as terrorism.7 The recent successes with the Belfast Agreement8 can be 
applied loosely to the Israeli/Palestinian situation as a remedy and answer to these crimes 
against humanity.
Part I of this paper discusses the background of each situation, which led to the 
humanitarian dilemmas in both Northern Ireland and Israel. Part II discusses the basis for 
international and crimes against humanity law. In addition, it describes the crimes that 
potentially could be proven in a situation arguably wrought with terrorism and 
governmental aggression, such as the Northern Ireland and Israel experiences.  In Part III, 
this article discusses the breakdown of the peace process in Northern Ireland and in 
Israel, their similarities, and how these breakdowns have hindered recourse for past 
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3crimes against humanity and created new ones. Part IV suggests a solution to address 
crimes against humanity by preventing further crimes, by providing recourse and remedy 
for past crimes and by permitting reconciliation between the Israeli and Palestinian 
peoples. Part V concludes that a solution to Israel’s havoc is possible, but any plan to 
achieve lasting peace must address peace, security and justice. 
I. BACKGROUND
A. Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland has been plagued by separation and discrimination since Henry 
VIII imposed Protestantism on the nation.9 Religious rebellions destabilized the area 
throughout the 1600s and again in the late 1700s. Protestants benefited greatly from the 
Industrial Revolution, while Catholics in Northern Ireland continued to live in an agrarian 
society.10 Discrimination was on the rise as a result of the success of the Protestants. 
From the mid-1800s to the start of World War I, nationalists fought to get a Home Rule 
Bill passed.11 Such a bill would remove a measure of British governmental control over 
Northern Ireland.  A Home Rule Bill was finally passed in 1912, but by then home rule 
was no longer enough to satisfy the nationalists.12
Violence broke out under the leadership of Sinn Fein in 1916. The Easter uprising 
was met with 30,000 British troops to stop 1,200 nationalists.13 For the most part, 
Protestants felt no ill effects from the uprising, while Catholics had their church services 
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4cancelled and their stores closed.14 Three years later, Sinn Fein representatives declared 
that Ireland was a republic.15 In 1921 a treaty was signed, creating a twenty-six county 
Irish Free State, while six counties remained a part of the United Kingdom.16
Similar to movements in other countries around the world at the time, civil rights 
demonstrations were being held in Northern Ireland in protest to the never-ending 
discrimination against Catholics in regards to housing, voting and employment.17 Riots 
and violence followed. The Bloody Sunday tragedy occurred in 1972 when British troops 
shot and killed “13 apparently unarmed civilians” who had been participants in an illegal 
march.18 In 1974, there was an attempt at power-sharing, but it lasted a mere five 
months.19 Despite that brief period, Northern Ireland remained under direct rule until the 
Northern Ireland Executive (established in the Belfast Agreement) took over in 1999.20
B. Israel
Discussion of the creation of a Jewish state began before the atrocities of World 
War II. A Jewish state had not existed since the middle of the first century when the
Diaspora scattered the Jewish people around the world.21 The Balfour Declaration of 
1917 outlined British dedication to the establishment of a Jewish home in Palestine 
(which was a British mandate at the time). The declaration also affirmed that such an 
establishment should not in any way cause detriment to the non-Jewish people living in 
14 Id. 
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5Palestine.22 The indigenous population of Palestine was extremely opposed to the 
“Zionist programme.”23 Revolts by the Arabs followed, which were brutally crushed by 
the British.24
Years followed without the formation of a Jewish state, but the events that 
occurred in Europe during World War II set the wheels in motion. The horrors of the 
Holocaust made the West far more sympathetic to the cause of a Jewish homeland. 
Locations other than Palestine were considered, but rejected.25  The Palestinian people 
“rejected the idea, accepted as natural in the West, that they had a moral obligation to 
sacrifice their land to compensate for the crimes committed by Europeans against 
Jews.”26 The position of the Palestinians was inconsequential to those making the 
decision and in November 1947 the United Nations General Assembly passed a 
resolution that called for the division of the Palestinian mandate into two states – one 
Jewish and the other Arab.27 General Assembly resolutions are largely regarded as non-
binding,28 but by May 1948 the Jewish state had come into existence. War immediately 
followed. Armies from the surrounding Arab states invaded the new state, but were 
defeated. After the war, Israel had claimed more territory than had originally been 
reserved for it. In 1964, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was created to 
give the Palestinian people an independent voice.29 Three years later, in 1967, a war 
22 NOAM CHOMSKY, FATEFUL TRIANGLE: THE UNITED STATES, ISRAEL & THE PALESTINIANS 90 (South 
End Press 1999).
23 Id.
24 Id. at 92.
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http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/v3_ip_timeline/html/1964.stm (last visited Apr. 30, 
2004).
6lasting only six days would have a great effect on the region. It was during this war that 
Israel seized Gaza and Sinai from Egypt and the Golan Heights from Syria, which 
doubled the amount of land under Israeli control.30 The region was again destabilized 
with the Yom Kippur War in 1973. “Unable to regain the territory they had lost in 1967 
by diplomatic means, Egypt and Syria launched major offensives against Israel on the 
Jewish festival of the Day of Atonement or Yom Kippur.”31 Israel was again successful 
in defeating their Arab neighbors. 
The Israeli army went on the offensive in 1982 with its invasion of Lebanon. The 
operation was intended to crush Palestinian guerillas.32 This dealt a huge blow to 
innocent Palestinians living in refugee camps in neighboring countries. Their safety was 
far from guaranteed.33 From the late 1980s to the early 1990s, an Intifada broke out in 
protest to the Israeli occupation of Gaza.34 The Intifada is most remembered for the 
Palestinian protesters who threw stones at the Israeli forces.35 Several attempts at peace 
failed following the Intifada. In 2000, Ariel Sharon’s presence at a holy site for Muslims 
and Jews in Jerusalem propelled the region into another Intifada.
30 A History of Conflict: The 1967 War, BBC NEWS, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/v3_ip_timeline/html/1967.stm (last visited Apr. 30, 
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7II. CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
A. Basis for Crimes Against Humanity 
“The principle of nullum crimen sine lege requires that the crimes at issue be 
judged solely from the perspective of the law in force” at the time of their commission.36
This notion has been at odds with that of crimes against humanity from the time of their 
first application during the Nuremberg Trials.  At that time, crimes against humanity 
embarked on a journey from the ivory towers of universities to the lookout towers of 
battlefields, as a natural law idea developed in the wake of the atrocities of World War II
(WWII). Crimes against humanity have been said to be “deemed unjustifiable at all 
times and in all circumstances.”37
The Nuremberg Trials were established by the Charter of the International 
Military Tribunal, in 1945, at the close of WWII, 38 for “just and prompt trial and 
punishment of the major war criminals of the European Axis.”39 This Charter defined 
crimes against humanity as:
Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed 
against any civilian population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, 
racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country 
where perpetrated.40
Subsequently, international tribunals were instituted in order to prosecute persons 
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law within the former 
36 See RATNER, supra note 4, at  310.
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8Yugoslavia (ICTY) and Rwanda (ICTR).41  Both of the tribunals utilized the following 
litany of offenses in terming crimes against humanity as acts “when committed in armed 
conflict, whether international or internal in character, and directed against any civilian 
population:
(a) murder;
(b) extermination;
(c) enslavement;
(d) deportation;
(e) imprisonment;
(f) torture;
(g) rape;
(h) persecutions on political, racial and religious grounds;
(i) other inhumane acts.”42
Additional expansion of the codified law, through customary international law, has 
eliminated the requirement of “a nexus to armed conflict”43 in the context of crimes 
against humanity.44 However, the ICTR Statute replaced that phrase with a requirement 
that “crimes be committed in a widespread or systematic manner” and be “motivated by 
‘national, political, ethnic, racial or religious grounds’” to meet the crimes against 
humanity standard.45 For example, a person accused of a crime against humanity must 
have done so “with the requisite intent and he must be aware of the context within which 
his acts are committed.”46
41 Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 808 (1993), art. 
5, at 13, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda, 33 I.L.M. 1598, 1603 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
42 See ICTY Statute supra note 41, at Art. 5 with ICTR Statute, at Art. 3.
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44
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9In addition, the International Law Commission, in its Draft Code of Crimes 
against the Peace and Security of Mankind, further augmented the definition of crimes 
against humanity by specifying as a criminal in Art. 5(f), “institutionalized discrimination 
on racial, ethnic or religious grounds involving the violation of fundamental human rights 
and freedoms and resulting in seriously disadvantaging a part of the population” and 
“arbitrary deportation or forcible transfer of population.”47
Crimes against humanity would be the likely charge with regard to Northern 
Ireland and Israel/Occupied Territories, even with the original limited definitions.  In 
both cases, an armed conflict has raged for decades.  Even if the United Kingdom is 
correct in its assertion that no armed conflict exists in Northern Ireland,48 crimes against 
humanity are independent of international covenants, being derived from customary and 
universal international law.  Thus, as was recognized by the International Criminal Court 
for Yugoslavia and International Criminal Court for Rwanda, a widespread or systematic 
commission of these crimes should propel them to the international stage, regardless of 
national law.  At the very least, the questions become arguable and should be addressed 
by all parties involved in order to reach a resolution that would be amenable to most and 
reparative to all.
The most likely suspects in the “subjugated populace/terrorist”—“hegemonic 
government/terrorist” environment include murder, torture, deportation and persecutions 
and institutional discrimination.  
47
 Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind, in Report of the International Law 
Comm’n on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, U.N. GAOP, 51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 93 [art. 5(f)], 
U.N. Doc. A/51/10 (1996) [hereinafter Code of Crimes].
48 See Rona, supra note 44, at n. 38.
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1. MURDER
In general, the Geneva Conventions seem to require “parties to any ‘armed 
conflict not of an international character’ to apply, ‘as a minimum’, certain standards to 
‘persons taking no active part in the hostilities’.”49  This includes “murder of all kinds.”50
While murder in general would merely be a humanitarian violation, systematic or 
widespread murder recently has been elevated to a crime against humanity.  This should 
include systematic suicide bombings, car bombings, and assassination attempts, which 
seem to have become commonplace in Israel/Occupied Territories.51  The International 
Criminal Tribunals in both Rwanda and Yugoslavia included this crime in their statutes.52
In fact, in both statutes, it is the first crime listed.
2. TORTURE
Torture has long been held a violation of customary law by virtue of its 
universally atrocious nature.  However, as a separate crime against humanity, it remains 
relatively new.  It appears on the lists of crimes against humanity and war crimes now, 
thanks in part to the 1975 adoption of the Declaration on Protection from Torture by the 
General Assembly of the United Nations.53 Each signatory must make torture a crime 
under its penal code, and it must prosecute offenders.54  Conventional law status was 
49 See RATNER, supra note 4, at 95.
50
 Geneva Conventions, Common Art. 3(a) (1949).
51 Annan Condemns Yassin Assassination, ALJAZEERA.COM, Mar. 22, 2004, available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/cgi-bin/news_service/middle_east_full_story.asp?service_id=919 (last visited 
Apr. 30, 2004); Israel: Bus bombing vindicates West Bank barrier, ALJAZEERA.COM, available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/cgi-bin/news_service/middle_east_full_story.asp?service_id=71 (last visited 
Apr. 30, 2004).
52 See ICTY Statute, supra note 41, at Art. 5 with ICTR Statute, at Art 3.
53 See RATNER, supra note 4, at 117.
54 Id.
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attached to the act with the 1984 promulgation of the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.55  Torture is defined as:
...[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is 
intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a 
third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third 
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or 
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any 
kind when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official 
capacity.56
The physical and mental integrity of the person is often cited as a reason against 
employing torture as an information gleaning device, as is the belief that evidence 
obtained through its utilization would be unreliable.57 The Convention also states that “no 
exceptional circumstances…may be invoked as a justification for torture…”58 In 1987, 
the Landau Report recommended that security agents in Israel “exercise the use of 
moderate physical and psychological pressure” on Palestinians suspected of security 
offenses,59 but it was not until 1999 that the Israeli Supreme Court admonished the 
practice.  Israel was the last democratic country in the world to officially sanction the use 
of torture.60
3. DEPORTATION
The International Criminal Court as well as the ICTY and ICTR require a 
widespread or systematic “attack” for an act to be considered a crime against humanity.  
This expands the scope of “crime against humanity” to include acts outside of armed 
55 Id.
56 CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR 
PUNISHMENT, Pt. I, Art. 1(1) (opened for ratification, Dec. 10, 1984), available at
www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_cat39.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2004) [hereinafter Torture Convention].
57 See Grebinar, supra note 37, at 271.
58 Id. at 270; RATNER, supra note 4, at 118.
59 See Grebinar, supra note 37, at 271.
60 Id.
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conflict as had been the case in the past.  This attack, however, is not limited to a 
“military attack and can include laws and administrative measures.”61 International law 
has developed to “protect conquered and occupied populations against forced relocation 
and internal displacement, obligations heightened during times of internal conflict.”62
Deportation includes “forcing people to leave an area in which they are lawfully 
present, without grounds permitted under international law; deportation involves crossing 
national frontiers and forcible transfers take place within national borders.”63
4. PERSECUTION/INSTITUTIONALIZED DISCRIMINATION
According to the ICTY, “persecution is an act or omission committed against 
someone on account of his or her race, religion, politics or ethnicity.”64 The ICTY statute 
spoke required the offense be “‘political, racial and religious grounds’ (emphasis added), 
whereas previous definitions required that an act be committed either on political, racial 
or religious grounds.”65 However, the ICTY has refused to acknowledge the difference in 
conjunction use.66 And the Code of Crimes adopted even broader perceptions of 
persecution in Art. 5(f). 
Moreover, the Nuremberg tribunals attempted to focus the blurred conception, to
which “persecution” gives rise by including: “deprivation of the rights to citizenship, to 
teach, to practice professions, to obtain education, and to marry freely; arrest and 
confinement, beatings, mutilation, and torture; deportation to ghettos; slave labor; and 
61 AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: FACT SHEET 4: PROSECUTING 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 1, available at www.amnestyusa.org/icc/factsheet_4.pdf.
62
 William Bradford, With a Very Great Blame on Our Hearts: Reparations, Reconciliation, and an 
American Indian Plea for Peace with Justice, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, n. 548 (citing UN ECOSOC Res. 
1999/47, E/CN.4/RES/1999/47 (Apr. 27, 1999) (confirming forced relocation and “ethnic cleansing” as 
matters of grave international concern). Id.
63 See Amnesty, supra note 61, at 2.
64
 Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic a/k/a “Dule”: Opinion and Judgment, U.N. Doc. IT-94-1-T, P697 (1997).
65 See ICTY Statute, supra note 41.
66 See Slye, supra note 40, at fn. 22 (citing Tadic, U.N. Doc. IT-94-1-T, at P713).
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extermination.”67 Also, incorporated into the definition of persecution were acts that 
seemed ‘Nazi-like.’ Concentration camps and “aryanization” were amongst those acts.68
B. Crimes Against Humanity in Northern Ireland
1. APPLICABLE STATE LAW
Currently, Northern Ireland has its own court system and parliament, but being
part of the United Kingdom permits the British government to exercise its sovereign right 
to promote the security of its borders.69  The British government has used this 
justification in order to derogate from accepted international law and agreements, namely 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.70
The British government has also promulgated its Terrorism Act of 2000, which is 
its latest attempt to route out terrorism throughout the kingdom and its protectorates.71
This act extends and amends the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act of 1996.72
The amendments attempt to strengthen evidence collection protections to citizens and 
also attempt to increase the ability of the authorities to control terrorism.73 Terrorism is 
defined as the use or threat of action “designed to influence the government or to 
intimidate the public or a section of the public, and…the use or threat is made for the 
67
 Slye, supra note 40, at 281 (quoting United States v. von Weizsaecker (The Ministries Case), in 14 Trials 
of War Criminals before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10 471 (1946-
49 with Telford Taylor, Final Report to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuernberg War Crimes Trials 
under Control Council No. 10, at 64-65 (1949)).
68 See Slye, supra note 40, at fn. 37.
69 See RATNER, supra note 4, at 161.
70
 Diane Marie Amann, Guantanamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 263, 309 (2004) (citing John Mintz, 
U.S. Adds Legal Rights in Tribunals; New Rules Also Allow Leeway on Evidence, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 
2002, at A-1).
71 See generally Terrorism Act (2000 c. 11), Sch 1.
72
 Terrorism Act (2000 c. 11), Sch 1, Para 6.
73
 Terrorism Act (2000 c. 11), Sch 1, Para 11 (providing that a court must give process to any person whose 
property might be affected or forfeited by information collection actions).
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purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.”74 This includes violence 
against any person, damage to property, endangerment of persons, or the creation of the 
risk to health or safety of the public.75 Any action that would cause a persons property to 
be forfeited through an information collection procedure can be heard by a court, and the 
information collection cannot be implemented until that person has exhausted all means 
of appeal.76
The act also proscribes certain organizations, such as the Irish Republican Army, 
the Ulster Freedom Fighters, The Loyalist Volunteer Force, Al-Qa’ida, Islamic Jihad, 
Hizballah, Hamas, etc.77 Membership in such organization subjects an individual to 
criminal sanctions. 78 These organizations are granted appeal rights; a special commission 
acts with regard to these appeals.79  In addition, the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act supplements this act.80
Any property that is in the possession of a person when they are convicted of a 
terrorism-related act is subject to forfeiture if the convicted person had intended to use or 
had reasonable cause to suspect that his property would be used for terrorism.81
However, if another person makes a claim that the property in question is his, he must be 
given the opportunity to be heard by the court before it makes its final order.82
74
 Terrorism Act (2000 c. 11), Pt. I § 1(1).
75
 Terrorism Act (2000 c. 11), Pt. I § 1(2).
76
 Terrorism Act (2000 c. 11), Sch 1, Para 11.
77
 Terrorism Act (2000 c. 11), Sch 2, Para 1.
78
 Terrorism Act (2000 c. 11), Pt. II § 11(1), § 13 (stating that wearing clothing or carrying an article that 
would arouse reasonable suspicion of membership in a proscribed organization is an offence).
79
 Terrorism Act (2000 c. 11), Sch 3, Para 7.
80
 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act (2001 c.24), Sch. 2(3), Para. 5.
81
 Terrorism Act (2000 c. 11), Pt. III § 23.
82
 Terrorism Act (2000 c. 11), Pt. III § 23.
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Further, any area may be cordoned off by a member of the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary who is of the rank of superintendent or greater.83  This may be done if the 
constable believes the measure “expedient for the purposes of a terrorist investigation.”84
This will only remain in effect for 28 days, but it may be extended by written request.85
In addition, if a person knows he might be of assistance to a terrorist 
investigation, he must disclose that information to the authorities as soon as reasonably 
practicable and failure to abide by this rule may subject that person to a prison term of up 
to six months.86
The Terrorism Act of 2000 further permits arrest without warrant of an individual 
reasonably suspected of being a terrorist.87  It permits the search of persons reasonably 
believed to be terrorists88 as well as the search of premises if it is reasonably suspected
that a terrorist is to be found there89 or if it would be necessary for the preservation of 
peace.90  Additionally, it would be an offense if one provided instruction or training in 
making or use of firearms or explosives or if he received that training.91 And, it would be 
an offense to collect information likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing 
for an act of terrorism.92
However, some safeguards have been extended.  Thus, a suspect may only be held 
up to four hours if no charge is forthcoming.93
83
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2. ALLEGATIONS
Murder, torture and deportation have been the crimes against humanity most often 
alleged as occurring in Northern Ireland.  Throughout much of the last forty years, 
various forms of republican paramilitary organizations, such as the Real Irish Republican 
Army, have carried out what have been described as widespread and systematic bombing 
campaigns directed at protestant northern Irish civilians.
These groups have been involved in many bombings like the 1998 bombing in 
Omagh, which is now the subject of a police inquiry.94 Loyalist groups have also been 
engaged in murder campaigns (although not bombings), such as cutting republican 
civilians into small pieces.95 And, there have been reports of widespread governmental 
aggression that has led to unarmed protesters being gunned down.  Bloody Sunday is one 
such incident.96
Additionally, the British army was arguably involved in the torturing of terrorist 
suspects.  It “used a combination of five ‘techniques’ (hooding, extended wall standing in 
painful postures, loud noises, sleep deprivation, and deprivation of food and drink) to 
interrogate suspects in an effort to obtain information to use against IRA terrorists.”97
The European Court for Human Rights classified these actions as inhumane and 
degrading, yet not torture under the European Convention on Human Rights.98  However, 
94 Nally Report Dismissed by Ombudsman, REPUBLICAN NEWS, Dec. 23-29, 2003, available at
http://republican-news.org (last visited Apr. 30, 2004).
95 Republican Anger as Prison Leave Denied, REPUBLICAN NEWS, Dec. 23-29, 2003, available at
http://repubican-news.org (last visited Apr. 30, 2004).
96 See TANNER, supra note 9, at 373.
97
 Seth F. Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: Constitutional Constraints on Torture in the War 
on Terror, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 278, n.10 (2003).
98 Id. 
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both are prohibited by the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment.99
Moreover, complaints have arisen regarding deportation of suspected terrorists, 
and there is a current possibility that a systematic deportation of civilian’s from the 
United States to the United Kingdom could be classified as a crime against humanity.  
The question revolves around whether these persons being deported due to suspicion of 
the British government are singled out due to political ties and beliefs or due to true 
terrorist activity.100  The act could be seen as systematic in that the British government 
has recently concluded a treaty of alteration with the United States whereby judicial 
review of deportation decisions would not be required.101 In the past there were 
systematic attempts to cleanse Northern Irish neighborhoods of Catholics, to the extent 
that some areas near Belfast were virtually Catholic-free.102
The point here is that whether these acts amounted to crimes against humanity has
not been addressed adequately by the European Court for Human Rights, as there is wide 
disagreement as to whether the acts amounted to widespread murder, torture or 
deportation.  Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom have recognized this; the Belfast 
Agreement and the Bloody Sunday Inquiry attempt to resolve the question through full 
community participation and discourse.  These disagreements strongly parallel those in 
99
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Israel and the Occupied Territories, and the implementation of a plan of action has 
strongly favored resolution.
C. Crimes Against Humanity in Israel
1. APPLICABLE STATE LAW
Israeli domestic law provides broad powers to military commanders who operate 
within the occupied territories of Palestine.103  Those commanders can respond in a 
flexible manner to “terrorist acts that impair the security of the population or threaten 
public order.104  Those who advocate such powers say, 
 …[E]ven a democratic state, finding itself in a grave predicament, such as 
the state of war, must equip its commanders with effective tools to provide an 
immediate response to terrorist acts—including not only ‘sophisticated 
weaponry’, but also legal tools that can provide for the immediate deterrence of 
potential terrorists.105
And, the Israeli government has subscribed to this belief for much of the state’s 
existence.  It may be legitimate since Israel has been struggling against terrorism since it 
was established.106
Israeli law permits administrative detention, as the occupied territories are 
governed, not by civil/judiciary bodies, but by a Military force that has maintained the 
states sovereignty since it expanded its territory following the Arab-Israeli and Six-days 
wars.107  The military force is governed by a broad range of rules known as the Defense 
(Emergency) Regulations of 1945.108
103 See Grebinar, supra note 37, at 274.
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 275.
106 Id. at 261.
107 See generally id.
108 Id. at 265.
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Regulations 108 and 111 authorized the military commander to detain a person if 
he “believed it necessary for maintaining public order or securing public safety or state 
security.”109 The Emergency Powers (Detention) Law of 1979 confined the commanders 
authority slightly by requiring a detention be the “sole” means of achieving a result; a 
judge would invalidate it otherwise.110
Further limitations were promulgated in Annon v. Minister of Defence, when the 
Supreme Court of Israel announced that every military administrative action would be 
subject to judicial review.111
In addition, the Regulations also permit demolition of houses because the military 
commander can confiscate land.112  The Supreme Court of Israel has held that 
international law is irrelevant to the discharge of Regulation 119, which permits the 
demolition and confiscation of property113 because it is part of domestic law.  The court 
required the military to respect proportionality and reasonableness when acting in 
accordance with the Regulations.114
2. ALLEGATIONS
Israeli interrogation practices parallel those of the British army in regard to 
suspected terrorists; they include “prolonged standing or uncomfortable sitting positions, 
tight hand or ankle cuffing, loud noise, sleep deprivation, hooding, cold rooms, and 
violent shaking.”115 “The U.N. Committee Against Torture and the Special Rapporteur 
109 Id.
110 Id. at 266.
111
 Annon v. Minister of Defence, 54(1) P.D. 721, 743 (Isr. 2000) (stating that a democratic society may 
hold a person in administrative detention only if such person poses a “direct threat and real danger to the 
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on Torture concluded that these practices are torture.”116  The Supreme Court of Israel 
prohibited these acts, which until that point had been legal by Military Regulation.117
Thus, even if, as the European Court for Human Rights determined, these 
interrogation tactics are merely inhumane and demeaning, a system must be established 
to give a final determination and to give redress.  That redress should go beyond the 
military’s response, which was to cease promoting explicitly the physical extraction of 
information.  The point of a peace building mechanism is to answer questions heretofore 
unanswerable and to bring recompense (if needed) and renewal.  The Supreme Court of 
Israel’s pronouncement provided none of this because the Palestinians are excluded from 
the system, from which the court pronounces.
Because they are excluded from this system, widespread and systematic attacks 
have been perpetrated by fringe-elements that see murder as the only option.  Murder 
would be classified as a crime against humanity in this instance because of the systematic 
means that the fringe-groups use.
As the Geneva Conventions attempt to identify, collective punishment will not 
effect change in this course of action, but it will provide a basis for prosecution of those 
attempting to route-out this “terrorism.”  A “state of emergency” with curfews, bypass 
roads, educational controls, and economic restraints, for forty years, might reach the level 
of an Apartheidic governmental structure.
“Since Apartheid was a state-wide system of racial discrimination, it is reasonable 
to conclude that apartheid constitutes a crime against humanity under this category.118
The Nazis followed a similar path by:
116 Id.
117 See id. with Kreimer, supra note 97, at n. 10.  Israel had been the only country to explicitly employ 
physical and demeaning means to gather information 
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contributing to the process for singling out Jews for persecution by imposing collective 
fines on the Jewish community; for signing decrees extending anti-Semitic legislation to 
the newly occupied territories; for drafting and administering various decrees excluding 
Jews from the social and economic sectors of German society…for signing a series of 
decrees requiring…the deportation of Jews from occupied territory.119
“The prohibition against racial discrimination is found in all the major international 
human rights treaties and is universally recognized as a rule of customary international 
law.”120
Further, Nuremberg Tribunal also included “offences against personal property as 
would amount to an assault upon the health and life of a human being (such as the 
burning of his house or depriving him of … his paid employment).”121 This seems to be 
what happened in the Israeli/Palestinian case.  Necessity has been cited, but as we have 
seen, that is not a defense to crimes against humanity.  These issues should be addressed 
so both the Israeli and Palestinian peoples can achieve a sense of solace and begin to 
reconnect their societies.
III. BREAKDOWN OF THE PEACE PROCESSES
A. Northern Ireland
Attempts at reaching a peace agreement between the parties of the Northern 
Ireland conflict reach almost as far back as the beginning of the conflict itself.122 The 
road to peace has been complicated, with one side or another pulling out of talks nearly 
118
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every time. In June 1973 the Northern Ireland Assembly was established.123 Protestants 
and Catholics decided in the Sunningdale Agreement124 to share power on a new 
Executive to address affairs within Northern Ireland.125 The agreement was rejected by 
the Unionists126 and the Ulster Workers’ Council127 organized strikes upon its 
approval.128 Eventually, resignations led to the downfall of the Executive.129 In 1985, 
talks again led to an agreement, this time it was the Anglo-Irish Agreement.130 British 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Irish Taoiseach Garret Fitzgerald signed the 
agreement in November 1985 that gave the Irish Republic a consultative role in Northern 
Ireland.131 After the agreement was signed, loyalist paramilitaries started a campaign of 
violence in protest against it.132 A few months later, the Northern Ireland Assembly 
dissolved.133
Talks between several political parties recommenced in 1992, but Unionists 
withdrew from them after eight months.134 The Unionists also greatly opposed a meeting 
in 1993 between then Prime Minister John Major and Social Democratic and Labour 
Party leader John Hume.135 That meeting led to the Downing Street Declaration that 
123 1972-75: The Failure of Sunningdale, BBC NEWS, Mar. 18, 1999, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/events/northern_ireland/history/64733.stm (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).
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stated that Sinn Fein (which had previously been left out of negotiations) could join 
future talks on Northern Ireland only if the IRA renounced violence.136 On August 31, 
1994 the IRA  announced a “complete cessation of military operations.”137  And 
according to the agreement, Sinn Fein met with British officials in the months that 
followed.138 The year that followed was marked by constant battle over 
decommissioning. The British refused to hold talks unless the republicans agreed to 
disarm and the republicans refused to do so before talks were held.139 The IRA’s 
ceasefire ended in 1996.140 Any discussions were bound to fail unless the IRA announced 
another ceasefire, which they did in 1997. 
Finally, in October 1997 all sides to the conflict sat down for talks at Stormont.141
During these talks, Prime Minister Tony Blair announced that an independent judicial 
inquiry would be established to investigate the events of Bloody Sunday in 1972.142 This 
move by Blair undoubtedly helped to relieve some of the distrust among the parties. 
While the inquiry has yet to promulgate its conclusions, it is clear that such an effort to 
discover the truth has improved upon the peace process. What ensued was the Belfast 
Agreement (commonly referred to as the Good Friday Agreement).143 From this 
agreement, the Northern Ireland Assembly was established to address relations within 
136 Id.
137 Id.; The Cease-fires: Republican and Loyalist, BBCI, available at
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/troubles/agreement/ceasefires.shtml (last visited Apr. 20, 2004). 
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Northern Ireland.144 Decisions made by this body are to reflect the positions of both sides 
of the society. 145 The North-South Ministerial Council was also created in the 
agreement.146 This entity handles relations between Northern Ireland and the Republic of 
Ireland. Finally, the British-Irish Inter-Governmental Conference was established to 
maintain open communications between the United Kingdom and Ireland.147 Also 
included in the Belfast Agreement was a pact that called for immediate 
decommissioning.148
The Agreement also established the Equality and Human Rights Commissions 
and called for full examinations of criminal justice and policing in Northern Ireland.149
According to the agreement, all segments of the community are to participate in the 
Assembly.150 The parties also agreed to an early release of terrorist prisoners from both 
sides.151 The agreement was put to a referendum in May 1998 and overwhelmingly 
approved; Assembly elections were held in September.152
The approval of the agreement has not meant a cure for the issues that have 
plagued Northern Ireland for decades. Implementing the agreement has been difficult at 
best and it is far too early to know if this agreement is the solution to Northern Ireland’s 
problems. Bombings have not stopped altogether since the agreement was made and the 
decommissioning process has been painfully slow. The IRA has occasionally decided that 
144 Key Issues: The Agreement, NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE ONLINE, available at 
http://www.nio.gov.uk/issues/agreemain.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).
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they would not disarm.153 Recently, they finally began the process of decommissioning. 
Each side has frequently accused the other side of not fulfilling its portion of the 
agreement.154 The release of prisoners has caused further controversy and delays.155
In addition, a truth commission known as the Bloody Sunday Inquiry was created 
to determine the true cause of the 1972 slaying of 13 unarmed protesters by British 
forces.156  The Inquiry is to “explore what really happened during the Troubles.”157  The 
process of making amends for crimes against humanity that occurred during the Troubles 
has taken hold and the families of victims “still want to learn the full facts of what 
happened.”158
The crimes were committed over such a long period and the lives of civilians in 
Northern Ireland were disrupted for so long that there is a belief that an “over-arching 
process to look into the whole violent history would be the best way to deal with the 
past.”159
B. Israel and the Occupied Territories
Crimes against humanity take place every day in Israel and the Occupied 
Territories. Whenever the Israeli army destroys Palestinian homes in attempt to find 
terrorists, they are committing persecutions as well as property crimes. Each time a 
153 Decommissioning, NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE ONLINE, available at
www.nio.gov.uk/issues/decomm.htm (last visited Apr. 20, 2004).
154 Peace Challenge “Lies with PMs,” BBC NEWS, Apr. 11, 2004, available at 
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Palestinian straps a bomb to his (and now her160) chest and wanders into a crowded 
marketplace, they are committing murder. Deportation is another crime against humanity 
that is at the center of this conflict. 
In 2003, the Israeli army began a large-scale destruction of Palestinian homes at a 
refugee camp in Rafah, Gaza Strip.161 The action caused hundreds to be without 
homes.162 It was taken in the name of security, but searches following the devastation 
have turned up no weapons.163
There have been several attempts at forming a peace plan between the Israelis and 
Palestinians. The Oslo I agreement was signed in 1993 and was composed of two 
stages.164 The first stage was designed to build good faith between the parties through 
mutual recognition, Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, Palestinian 
administration in specific areas and a cessation of violence by the Palestinians.165 After 
such conditions were maintained for a period of five years final negotiations could begin 
that would confirm borders for the Palestinian state, settle the question of Jerusalem, deal 
with Israeli settlements and Palestinian refugees.166 Unfortunately, neither side honored 
its part of the deal.167
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The Oslo II agreement was signed in 1995 and intended to increase Palestinian 
autonomy.168 Unfortunately, before any parts of the agreement could be implemented, 
then Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated by an orthodox Jew who was 
against the Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank.169 Bus bombings by Palestinians then 
reinitiated.170
The Roadmap to Peace in the Middle East was drawn up in 2003 by the United 
States, European Union, the Russian Federation and the United Nations and those four 
players would assist in the implementation of the peace plan.171 The two-state solution 
was broken into three phases. The first phase, initially planned to be completed by May 
2003, was to include an end to the violence and terrorism that has plagued the region, a 
normalization of Palestinian life and the creation of Palestinian institutions.172 These 
measures involved the Israeli government improving the humanitarian crisis that the 
Palestinians find themselves in. And, this phase also called for Israel to dismantle 
settlement outposts established since March 2001 within the Occupied Territories.173 The 
second phase of the roadmap was to create an independent Palestinian state with 
temporary borders and a certain level of sovereignty by December 2003.174 Statehood 
was to be contingent upon the Palestinians having strong leadership opposed to terrorist 
168
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activity.175 The problem with this requirement is that it is completely subjective. Israeli 
authorities could easily suggest that one suicide bombing indicates that the Palestinian 
leadership supports terrorism. Finally, the third phase of the roadmap offers permanent 
status to the Palestinian state, a solution to the refugee issue that has been created 
throughout the conflict and end to the conflict by 2005; a tidy presumption.176 The 
timeline for the roadmap is completely arbitrary. It is nearly impossible to put such time 
limits on such a volatile conflict.177 This is not to mention the fact that many 
requirements within the roadmap are vague and subject to the interpretation of the parties 
involved. It would be difficult for Palestinian leaders to agree to a peace plan with vague 
terms for statehood since they would have no idea what the Palestinian state would entail. 
The roadmap has failed to work mainly because the Israeli government will have 
nothing to do with the plan until the suicide bombings stop, which they have not. The 
cyclical nature of this conflict is the most significant obstruction to protecting residents of 
both Israel and the Occupied Territories from crimes against humanity. Since 2000, when 
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon visited the Noble Sanctuary (as it is known to 
Muslims) or the Temple Mount (as it is known to Jews), suicide bombings have been
followed Israeli strikes which again have been followed by suicide bombings.178 It 
appears as if the suicide bombings will never cease since they are always in response to 
Israeli force, which is exercised after a previous suicide bombing. If the cycle never 
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stops, peace will never be achieved and both sides will continue to use excessive force 
and illegal tactical manoeuvres.
IV. MODEL FOR ISRAELI/PALESTINIAN RECOVERY
A. Proposal for Israel/Occupied Territories
The crimes against humanity that have occurred during the most recent years in 
Israel and the Occupied Territories have been horrendous. The cycle of violence and 
degradation that exists between these two peoples seems to have no end in sight. Unless a 
concrete peace agreement can be established that outlines the exact specifications for a 
Palestinian state and unless the Palestinian suicide bombings are stopped, the crimes 
against humanity will continue. 
Regardless of the fact that war crimes may have been committed within 
Ireland/Northern Ireland or Israel/Occupied Territories, their divergent political climates 
have produced greatly variant reactions by both the international community and national 
agendas. However, a common legal mechanism must be adopted.
To some extent, the Irish process has progressed further than the Middle East's.  
Although there have been conflicts amongst and between groups in both of these 
localities for extended periods of time, true, widespread conflict did not erupt until the 
late 1960s and early 1970s.179  They proceeded through times of greater and lesser 
tension, only to arrive at peace agreements, which were then disrupted by violence (often 
from every faction).
Recent peace agreements, the Belfast Agreement and the Roadmap for Peace have 
had varying levels of success. And, as the opposing forces sing self-laudatory praises for 
179 See generally TANNER, supra note 9 compare CHOMSKY, note 22.
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their successes and cast dismal rebukes of their adversaries for their failures, war crimes 
have been perpetrated, justified and repeated.180
The solution is clear.  Any plan must provide increased avenues of open 
communication, a sense of solace with a coordinate sense of security for victims, and 
specific, precise structure to address Israeli/Palestinian relations for the future.  An 
approach combining the Belfast Agreement together with the Bloody Sunday Inquiry will 
serve as a useful, but imperfect, four-part model as both have attempted to address
problems of security, mutual understanding and rights of victims.  This proposal includes: 
1) a combination Truth Commission/Quasi-National War Crimes Tribunal (Commission); 
2) an Equality and Human Rights Council (Council); 3) an Executive Assembly
(Assembly); and 4) Community Building Bodies (CBBs).
B. Alternative Mechanisms
1. NATIONAL TRIALS
“Domestic legal systems remain the primary fora for holding individuals 
accountable” for crimes against humanity.181 This is probably so because it is the closest
administrative level to the occurrences.  The national court system in a state where a 
crime against humanity purportedly occurred can be better equipped to obtain evidence 
and witnesses because it controls the police powers at the local level to provide 
enforcement.
180 EEtta Prince-Gibson & Ariel Jerozolimski, Taking Terror to Court, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 21, 2003, at 
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In addition, national trials fit well with the international law concepts of 
jurisdiction.  If a crime occurred within a state or its effect was immediately felt within 
the state, the general rule is that the state should have jurisdiction.182 And, states have 
jurisdiction over offenders who are their nationals and in cases where “extraterritorial 
conduct would have an actually or potentially harmful effect on important interests of the 
state.”183
However, states that wish to try these cases themselves must have domestic 
criminal law statutes implementing their obligation to prosecute.184 A judiciary is only as 
good as its ability to operate, and while greater access to evidence, witnesses, victims, 
and perpetrators185 might be encouraging, the system has to function in order to realize 
any gain from that advantage.  Israeli law is just that, Israeli.  Because the proper 
functioning of the system is dependent on an agreeable corpus of law, it would be 
difficult to get Palestinian cooperation with trials prosecuting laws which they might feel 
would strongly favor Israelis.  This is bolstered by the fact that the Occupied Territories 
function under military regulations and minor local rules rather than any type of national 
law.
Under normal circumstances, a national judiciary would be able to try these types 
of cases in a more cost-effective manner; however, the Occupied Territories are ruled by 
military commanders whose decisions are merely subject to review by Israeli courts.  In 
order for trials to have legitimacy, they would have to include Palestinian systems.  This 
182 Id. at 161.
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necessity makes national courts no more cost-effective than a hybrid Israeli/Palestinian 
judiciary.
Furthermore, national trials would normally permit more of a connection with the 
proceedings to be felt by the population,186 but there are two nations involved here: 
Palestinian and Israeli.  Israelis would not feel connected to a Palestinian system because 
they probably would not feel comfortable traveling within those territories and might feel 
the court is skewed against them.  Palestinians, on the other hand, would have a similar 
reaction to Israeli national trials and these could fragment the society more by inciting 
fringe elements who might think their cause was not being preserved.
Finally, since “serious violations are usually committed on behalf of or with the 
complicity of the state,” truly independent judiciaries and political cultures less tolerant 
of human rights abuses must be developed. 187  This can make a national judiciary truly 
ineffective and it parallels the dysfunction that a mere Palestinian national court would 
face in that it would be lacking in appropriate numbers of trained judges and attorneys, 
adequate infrastructure and a “culture of respect for the fairness and impartiality of the 
process and rights of the accused.”188
2. INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS
If a crime is so “heinous” as to be harmful to the world population in general, it is 
said that any state can take jurisdiction to prosecute it.189 Crimes against humanity would 
be included in the list of offenses that justify this “universal jurisdiction.”190  Most states 
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believe that offenses relating to their persons, territory, or security should be tried by their 
courts.
However, because crimes against humanity are subject to universal jurisdiction, 
that does not necessitate their prosecution within in an international arena.  A national, 
international, or hybrid court system can function properly as well.  The main force 
behind the choice of jurisdiction is whether it can ensure the crimes, attempts to commit 
them, and complicity in their commission are offenses that carry punishment by the 
appropriate penalties.191
In the case of Israel and the Occupied Territories legitimacy of the court is very 
important due to the politically charged debates surrounding the situation.  A tribunal 
with international character would exude a perception of legitimacy.  Crimes against 
humanity have been developing through customary and conventional law for the better 
part of a century, and using them in a case as high profile as the Israeli/Palestinian 
question would provide a much needed foundation of support, which would be looked 
upon well by the international community since it has worked hard to define more clearly 
crimes against humanity law.  
Also, as pointed out above, national trials in this context would most likely be 
ineffective and possibly detrimental.  However, the United Nations may be “suffering 
from tribunal fatigue.”192  This would make it more difficult to get the momentum of the 
international political machine churning.  And, as some have noted, situations with a high 
191 See generally RATNER, supra note 4, at 165.
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level of political significance may make it impossible for the Security Council to take any 
action.193
Further, if the necessary political machinery were geared up, legitimacy would 
again be challenged as to the impartiality of a system so politically charged.  The 
question would have to be asked whether the court would have the ability to acquit a 
defendant.  If the international community is truly concerned about the legitimacy of 
international law over that of the court’s legitimacy, an acquittal might just bring down 
the house of cards that international crimes against humanity law and enforcement might 
be.  
A hybrid court on the other hand, would have less political machinery to move.  It 
could save legitimacy by maintaining an all inclusive atmosphere and it would have the 
ability to enforce its judgments, which is lacking in international courts.
C. Benefits of Truly Holistic and Comprehensive Plan
1. TRUTH COMMISSION/QUASI-NATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL
As with the Bloody Sunday Inquiry, a truth commission would be established. 
This would serve to elicit facts of underreported, unreported, and previously unknown 
incidents of war crimes and crimes against humanity.  It would work in conjunction with 
a quasi-national war crimes tribunal.  The war crimes tribunal would be composed of four 
justices, two Palestinians and two Israelis, and they should decide cases based on 
international and national law by simple majority, with particular procedures in the case 
of a stalemate.  The composition of the tribunal justices would ensure fair and unbiased 
trials. The injured persons and injured societies need to see that justice is being done in 
the same vein as security is being restored, and an equal number of justices from each 
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camp (and without foreign intervention) will ensure magnanimous results, which each 
side would see as fair and free of prejudice.
In addition, the tribunal would hear and try cases addressing war crimes 
perpetrated by and upon both sides, and it would investigate and prosecute suspected war 
criminals of every rank.  This process would function in conjunction with the truth 
commission. Further, and in an effort to promote the collection of knowledge regarding 
the war crimes and crimes against humanity caused during the past 60 years, the truth 
commission would have amnesty granting powers.  Individuals could voluntarily discuss 
their experiences that involved war crimes, or suspected war criminals could petition the 
commission for amnesty from prosecution by the tribunal or reduced sentences in 
exchange for clear, probative information.
Although potentially a political stumbling block, amnesty granting power remain 
necessary as an information gathering tool, just as they were in South Africa’s Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission.194 Reconciliation is a process; one mechanism will not 
create cross-community legitimacy.195  As in Northern Ireland, there are weaknesses in 
the criminal justice system that need to be supplemented, as the courts cannot be skewed 
or seen as skewed toward any one side.  Also, as in Northern Ireland, there was no 
“clear” discrediting of a government or system of government that brought about the 
commission.196 Thus, this new tactic should effectively supplement the process that the 
trials commence.
194 See Smith, supra note 156.
195 Id.
196 Id.
36
2. EQUALITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL
An equality and human rights council would be established.  Similar to the Belfast 
Agreement, it would examine the criminal justice and policing mechanisms available and 
in use in the Occupied Territories.  In many cases, the war crimes perpetrated against 
Palestinians by Israeli troops and against Israelis by Palestinian militants were 
precipitated by harsh, conditions that prior “one-size-fits-all” security arrangements 
created.  The commission would attempt to judge security threats based on competent 
information and would hold impartiality as its cornerstone in order to limit the role of 
politics in its reactions to certain situations.  
The Belfast Agreement concentrated its beginning stages on lessening the 
violence in Northern Ireland before proceeding further towards peace.197 And, likewise, 
the Roadmap for Peace required that violence stop before normalization of life for 
Palestinians could occur.198 While this process has seemed to work in Northern Ireland, it 
has been a long straining course of developments, which have, in a number of instances, 
required great strength in moving forward despite deadly bombing attacks by forces 
opposed to the peace process.199  The Roadmap’s Phase I, which requires cessation of 
violence before Palestinian life can be terminated is a non sequitur as the great majority 
of the Palestinian populace is not involved in terrorist attacks.  The Occupied Territories, 
however dangerous and insecure, require detailed and particularized assessments which 
do not trample on the rights of residents.  The Roadmap’s Phase I acknowledges the war 
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crimes of over-aggressive tactics, persecution, and property crimes in addition to the fact 
that it arguably violates the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, which circumscribe the use of collective punishment.200
The Equality and Human Rights Commission would attempt to ensure that the 
rights and liberties of a collective population are not withheld, that their lives are not 
made “non-normal,” as a result of certain sporadic and vindictive militant elements.  
Because terrorist activity is recognized to come from extreme factions within a society,201
it is unwarranted and impedes the peace process to react with “politically correct” 
ruthlessness to attacks. The commission would attempt to react in the most reasoned and 
reserved manner practicable without political influence.
3. EXECUTIVE ASSEMBLY
Northern Ireland’s Assembly was created by the Belfast Agreement in order to 
devolve some governmental powers to both the Protestants and Catholics.202  In the past, 
much of the controversy arose over demographic problems, such as protestant attempts to 
exclude the Catholic majority from political power through strategic gerrymandering.203
The new Assembly attempted to create some level of power sharing.  This proposal 
would attempt to promote mutual respect and collective functioning amongst the Israelis 
and the Palestinians.  They would not necessarily live in the same communities (although 
the ultimate goal is mutual inclusion), but they would be able to make collaborative 
efforts to make positive changes in the reason.  The Palestinian occupied regions of the 
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Territories have been estimated to have two-thirds to three-quarters of the population 
unemployed, with most of those persons living under the UN designated poverty line of 
$2 per day.204  Such a collaborative effort as a Joint Assembly for the Occupied 
Territories would alleviate such problems to a degree as well as assist Israel and Jewish 
settlers in obtaining much needed water in Palestinian Occupied soils.  This proposed 
assembly would make mutual decisions on local issues that currently are made by Israeli 
Military Administrators on a “cookie cutter” basis, which has failed to work in any truly 
effective way.
4. COMMUNITY BUILDING BODIES
Joint Palestinian/Israeli relations in the future are even more important than those 
in place at the time of the agreement.  A community atmosphere will not merely appear 
because an agreement is made.  Bodies must be established which would take this reality 
into account and assist the above mentioned Assembly in cultivating mutual respect for 
one another as well as cultivating a system whereby an agreement reached between the 
parties will survive in its functional capacity.  
The Roadmap for Peace provided certain protections and procedures, but they 
were set in a subjective light.205  Each side determined whether the other was complying 
on its own accord.  In fact, a recent suicide bombing on March 15, 2004 prompted Ariel 
Sharon, Israel’s current Prime Minister to refuse to negotiate with the Palestinians.206
The Roadmap permits Israel to walk away from negotiations if it feels, in its own 
political scheme, that the Palestinian cause is led by terrorist forces (indirectly or 
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directly).207  Vague requirements such as this would have to be eliminated to the best of 
the factions’ abilities, but when writing an agreement prospectively it is nearly 
impossible to eliminate all vagaries.  To combat this, the bodies created to shepherd the 
Israelis and the Palestinians to lasting peace would be able to make declaratory 
judgments regarding agreement language and interpretation as well as foster ongoing 
negotiations in order to work through troubles.  The Belfast Agreement is more time 
conscious than the Roadmap.  Problems have persisted in Northern Ireland,208 but the 
parties have persisted in their commitment for peace over the long term.209 However, the 
Roadmap for Peace, signed in 2003, projected peace by 2005.210  A limitation on time 
cannot be placed on the attainment of lasting peace, which is, after all, the ultimate goal 
here.
In order to get Israel and the Occupied Territories prompted for a lasting peace 
and implementation of a peace agreement, a timeline might be used as a guideline, but it 
cannot be proclaimed.  Beyond the impact of a timeline, however, the parties have to be 
truly ready to commit to the agreement; to commit to peace.  Evidence of this is that war 
crimes and crimes against humanity need to be discontinued.  This applies to all sides in 
the matter; the Israelis cannot expect the Palestinians (however few of them) to lay down 
their arms without an actual commitment from the Israeli Military Administration of life 
normalization.  There needs to be some degree of trust (or a leap of faith) on both sides in 
order for an agreement to be implemented effectively.  There cannot be collective 
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punishment, there cannot be suicide bombings, there cannot be hostage takings, there 
cannot be internment.  Both sides must release the prisoners they hold which are “thought 
maybe to have possibly been involved” in a war crime.  To accomplish this there must be 
a return to the rules of law enforcement and an end to the rules of war.  Deportations 
must stop and decommissioning must begin.
Difficulties do remain, however. One of the main weaknesses of finding an 
agreement with the necessary independence to be effective is that it must find financial 
support.  Who will pay for the investigations, trials, commissions and community 
building bodies?  That question has to be worked out in the negotiations, but it is sure to 
be a central point as the Occupied Territories are some of the poorest regions in the 
world.  Israel’s long-time supporter, the United States,211 may need to continue its 
assistance, but that limits Israel’s ability to react to terrorists (especially since September 
11, 2001) in a manner other than through force.
In addition, mere truth commissions and war crimes tribunals might not seem 
sufficient to the Jewish settlers or Palestinian residents who feel they were wronged by 
their opposition.  They may clamor for reparations or some other form of restitution; 
however, it is unlikely that any agreement or peace plan would include these, as both 
sides have felt their actions were justified to some degree.  Furthermore, asking for 
reparations or aid might re-ignite an already shaken and volatile community’s emotions.
V. CONCLUSION
The Israeli/Palestinian situation is complicated.  To that end, any solution for the 
allegations of crimes against humanity requires a multi-faceted approach.  The 
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heinousness of widespread or systematic murder, torture, deportation, and persecution 
require specific plans to route out their perpetrators, provide solace to victims, and to 
provide reconciliation.  Regardless of whether these crimes can be proven, their 
allegation necessitates reaction and resolution.  Hardly a time comes when it is perfectly 
clear whether a crime has in fact been committed.
Thus, following the model of Northern Ireland’s process of addressing allegations 
of crimes against humanity, one is able to develop a structure that does the same for 
Israel and the Occupied Territories.  Both situations revolved around violence in light of 
religion, politics, and property rights.  And, each had a marginalized people desperate for 
change.  A truth commission, quasi-national tribunal, equality and human rights council, 
executive assembly and community building bodies may provide the necessary building 
blocks to accompany the two nations on their path toward survival, reconciliation and 
prosperity.
